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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY B. RENTMEISTER, / 
Plaintiff and / 
Respondent, 
/ 
vs. 
/ 
JUNE R. DeSILVA, JAMES Case No. 14366 
HOWARD RENTMEISTER, and / 
DONALD NEIL RENTMEISTER, 
TRUSTEES OF THE ESTATE OF / 
DELLA ZILLAH C. RENTMEISTER, 
/ 
Defendants and 
Appellants, / 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Respondent, who was the 
Plaintiff in the Lower Court, against the Appellants, who are 
Co-Trustees and beneficiaries of the residuary estate, wherein 
the Respondent seeks to compel the distribution of the estate 
in accordance with the terms of an inter vivos trust agreement. 
The Counterclaim of the Co-Trustees, who are also beneficiaries 
under the terms of the inter vivos trust agreement, seek to 
exclude the Respondent from participating in the distribution 
of the residuary estate of the deceased Settlor, and to limit 
the distribution to the Respondent of only the specific bequest 
set forth in the inter vivos trust agreement and seeking a 
reformation of paragraph F of Article III of the Trust Agreement 
so as to prevent Respondent from participating in a one-fourth 
equal distribution of the residual trust estate in accordance 
with the provisions set forth in said paragraph. The basis 
set forth for the reformation of the Trust Agreement is alleged 
to be a scrivener's error on the part of the attorney who drafted 
the trust instrument. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court granted Judgment in favor of Respondent 
and against Appellants, holding that an inter vivos trust cannot 
be altered after the death of Settlor by a claim of scrivener's 
error, where the dispositive terms of the trust are sought 
to be altered without proof of fraud or undue influence. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks upholding of the Judgment of the Lower 
Court and the denial of any right of reform of the trust instrument 
and that the terms of the trust instrument be carried forth 
in the manner clearly and unequivocally set forth therein. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The testimony set forth in the Lower Court revealed 
that the Decedent, Delia Zillah C. Rentmeister, (R-39), who 
will hereinafter be referred to herein as the Settlor, employed 
the services of Attorney William J. Critchlow, III, who will 
hereinafter be referred to herein as Settlor's Attorney, for 
the purposes of estate planning and that the Settlor's Attorney 
did draft an inter vivos trust in September, 1968, (R-39), 
and that the Settlor had four children, namely James Howard 
Rentmeister, Donald Neil Rentmeister, June R. DeSilva, who 
are also the Defendants and Appellants in the instant matter 
before this Court, and Ned Everest Rentmeister, who was deceased 
at the time of the making of the inter vivos trust and is and 
was survived at all times herein by the Respondent, Larry B. 
Rentmeister, who was also the grandson of the Settlor and the 
only child surviving of the Decedent, Ned Everest Rentmeister. 
(R-39) 
A Family Trust Agreement was drafted on October 3, 1968, 
and subscribed to by the Settlor and by the three Trustees, 
June R. DeSilva, James Howard Rentmeister, and Donald Neil 
Rentmeister, the Appellants herein (R-53). 
The Settlor reserved to herself the right to amend or 
revoke the Trust or to change the beneficiaries thereof, or 
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to withdraw the whole or any part of the trust estate by filing 
a notice of revocation, modification/ change, or withdrawal 
with the Trustees (R-48). 
The Trust Agreement further provided under Article III, 
paragraph E, as follows: 
After the payment of debts and expenses and the 
withdrawal of all personal affects as hereinabove 
provided, Larry B. Rentmeister shall have the right 
to withdraw from the trust estate the sum of $5,000.00. 
In the event that he shall fail to make such withdrawal, 
or should die before making such withdrawal, said 
sum shall be distributed by Trustees to his surviving 
descendants and dependents for the purpose of providing 
such descendants and dependents with care, support, 
maintenance, medical care, and education. (R-50) 
Under the same Article III in paragraph F thereof, the 
Trust Agreement further provided as follows: 
After the payment of debts and expenses and the 
withdrawals as hereinabove provided, Trustees 
shall divide the balance of the trust estate into 
equal shares, one for each of Grantorfs children 
then living, and one for each of Grantor's children 
then deceased, leaving living descendants. (R-
50) 
Under Article III, paragraph F, subparagraph 4a, the 
Trust Agreement provided as follows: 
Upon the death of a child of Grantor or lawful 
descendant of a deceased child of Grantor for 
whom a trust is then held, such trust, to the 
extent not appointed as hereinabove provided, 
shall be apportioned in partial shares among his 
or her living lawful descendants upon the prin-
ciple of representation, which partial shares 
shall be held, administered, and distributed as 
separate trusts ***. (R-51) 
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On November 8, 1971, an amendment to the Family Trust 
Agreement was made by the Settlor, wherein the Trust Agreement 
of October 3, 1968, was amended only as to paragraph E of 
Article III, and substituted therein was the following: 
E. LARRY B. RENTMEISTER. After the payment of 
debts and expenses and withdrawal of all personal 
affects as hereinabove provided, Larry B. Rentmeister 
shall have the right to withdraw from the trust 
estate the sum of $7f000.00. In the event he 
shall fail to make such withdrawal, or should 
he die before making such withdrawal, said sum 
shall be distributed by Trustees to his surviving 
descendants and dependents for the purpose of 
providing such descendants and dependents with 
care, support, maintenance, medical care, and 
education* 
The foregoing Amendment was subscribed to by the Settlor 
on November 8, 1971, and also by the three Appellants, who 
were also the Trustees of the Estate. (R-55) No other amendment 
or change of the original Agreement has been presented in evidence 
before the Court. 
At time of trial in the Lower Court, the only witness 
brought forth was Settlorfs Counsel, and prior to any material 
testimony being given by said witness, Counsel for the Respondent 
made objection to any testimony of the witness. (R-79) Counsel 
for Respondent asked for an acknowledgement by the Court and 
Counsel for Appellants, that there be a continuing objection 
to any testimony by Settlor's Attorney, which was stated by 
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the Court and agreed to by Counsel for the Appellant. (R-80) 
Counsel for the Appellants further stipulated: 
Rather than disrupt the proceedings/ your Honor, 
we would agree that he (Counsel for Respondent) 
objects to any testimony from Mr. Critchlow, and 
let it go at that. I don't think there is a problem 
on that. I will tell the Supreme Court that. < 
(R-80) 
A reiteration of such objection was again made by Counsel 
for the Respondent and acknowledged by Counsel for Appellants. 
(R-81) 
The Settlor's Attorney testified, that he personally 
dictated the original Trust Agreement and the subsequent Amendment 
to the Trust Agreement. (R-88) 
The Settlor became demised on November 2, 1913, at the 
age of 78 (R-88), leaving an estate in the amount of $113,629.87 
(R-89). 
The Settlor's Attorney further testified that he had 
been advised by the Settlor, that her son, Ned, was killed 
in 1944, and that the Settlor was the beneficiary of her son's 
G.I. insurance in the sum of $10,000.00. (R-92) The Respondent 
herein being the only living child of the Settlor's deceased 
son, Ned, and a grandson of the Settlor (R-92,R-46). 
The Settlor's Attorney further testified that it was 
not uncommon in his practice of drafting testamentary instruments 
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for a parent to leave to a deceased child's children the share 
the deceased child would have received (R-94). 
Further testimony of Settlor's Counsel was to the affect, 
that at the time of the signing of the original Trust Agreement 
on October 3, 1968, (R-54), the Settlor and the three Appellants 
were present in the offices of Counsel for the Settlor (R-
95), and that the Settlor read the Trust Agreement, that Settlor's 
Counsel presumed that the three Trustees, the Appellants herein, 
also read the Trust Agreement (R-96) and that the Counsel for 
the Settlor did not read the Trust Agreement (R-96). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
INTER VIVOS TRUST CANNOT BE REFORMED ON ALLEGATION 
OF SCRIVENER'S ERROR WHEN ITS CONTENT AND INTENT 
ARE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL. 
The Complaint of the Respondent, who was the Plaintiff 
in the Lower Court, brought an action against the Trustees 
of the trust estate of the Settlor, to compel the Trustees 
to make distribution of the one-fourth equal share in the remainder 
of the estate in accordance with the provisions of the Family 
Trust Agreement following the demise of the Settlor, which 
occurred on November 2, 1973. (R-14,R-33) 
The defense of the Appellants, who were the Defendants 
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in the Lower Court/ sets forth that through inadvertence and 
mistake of the Settlor's Attorney in the preparation of the 
Trust Agreement/ that the appropriate exclusionary language 
excluding the Respondent from participating in the residue of 
said estate was not included in the distribution paragraph F 
of the Trust Agreement (R-16/R-45)/ and requested that the 
Court should reform the Trust Agreement to comply with the 
Settlor's intent as alleged by the testimony of Settlor's Attorney. 
The Court in its Memorandum Decision gave Judgment to 
the Respondent and against the Appellants/ holding that the 
Trustor executed the trust as an inter vivos act on October 3/ 
1968/ and made an Amendment thereon on November 8/ 1971, and 
the Settlor being now deceased, the first effort to reform 
the instrument occurred April 10/ 1974/ by means of the Answer 
and Counterclaim filed by the Appellants, in response to the 
Complaint seeking enforcement of the trust by the Respondent. 
CR-59) 
The Court found that the Co-Trustees are children of 
the deceased/ Settlor/ and that the Respondent is the only 
child of the deceased child of the Settlor, and stated that 
the issue presented to the Court was whether the dispositive 
provisions on the death of an inter vivos Settlor can be reformed 
after death of the Settlor upon the claim of a scrivener's 
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error, and held that the rules to be applied in a determination 
of the reformation of an inter vivos trust, such as that before 
the Lower Court, are the rules which must be applied pertaining 
to Wills. (R-59) 
The Appellants cited on page 8 of their Brief, the case 
of In Re Harmon's Trust, 164 N.Y.S.2d 468, wherein the Supreme 
Court of New York held: 
If in fact there was a scrivener's error in transcrib-
ing Settlor's intention at the time of creating 
the Trust, it is correctible by the Court in an 
action to reform the instrument ** in all the 
cases where reformation was granted by the Court, 
Petitioner presented direct and convincing evidence 
.of the necessary fact of Settlor's original intentions 
and instructions and of the mistake in the instru-
ment as drawn. 
This cited case involved an irrevocable trust, which 
empowered the Trustee, who was the Settlor's only son, to make 
only such investments as were permitted by the laws of the 
State of New York for the investment of trust funds. Approximately 
six months later, the then still living Settlor executed a 
second document amending the first document and permitting 
the Trustee to invest and re-invest the proceeds which he deemed 
in his discretion to be in the best interest of the Trust. 
The Amended Trust Agreement was executed by the Settlor and 
by all of the adults involved in the first trust, but there 
were then in being six grandchildren of Settlor who, because 
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of infancy, were incapable of giving consent. The grandchildren, 
who had a contingent interest as remaindermen in the trust, 
and having a vested interest in accordance with the Statutes 
of the State of New York, and not having executed the document, 
had a right to subsequently object to the altering of the irrevocable 
trust by the drafting of a second trust, which had changed 
the conditions and terms of investment by the Trustee. Following 
the demise of the Trustee, it was determined that there had 
been losses occasioned by the unauthorized transactions as 
were allowed by the second Trust Agreement, and a Petition 
was filed by the Executors of the deceased Trustee alleging 
scrivener's error in the first Trust Agreement and seeking 
to reform the original indenture to state and conform to the 
second Trust Agreement. 
The Court actually held, that inasmuch as both the Trustee 
and Settlor were demised and there was no direct evidence brought 
out of the intent of the Settlor, and a reformation was attempted 
to be made by relying on circumstantial evidence, the Court 
held: 
Whatever the real facts, it is clear that both 
Settlor and her son were educated persons and 
must have read and understood this lengthy and 
express limitation clause deliberately inserted 
in the indenture, particularly in the case of 
a son who as the "scrivener" would necessarily 
have been conscious of the very words he was using 
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to express that intention. This is not a situation 
of a mere omission, concerning which there may 
be doubt as to whether through inadvertence instruc-
tions have not been followed, but of a clearly " 
expressed and complete clause.*** 
The Court denied the Petition for revision based upon alleged 
scrivener's error. 
The facts in the instant matter before the Court are 
to the effect, that the Counsel for the Settlor is a competent 
attorney who is skilled in the drafting of testamentary and 
trust instruments and that the clear and unequivocal words 
as set forth by him, which he has alleged as having personally 
dictated (R-88), with the testimony by Settlor's Counsel, that 
he presumes that the client read the Trust Agreement prior 
to subscribing thereto (R-96), and further presumed that the 
three Trustees also read the trust instrument prior to signing, 
and the very nature of the dispositive part of the Trust Agreement 
as set forth in Article III, Paragraph F, does not subject 
itself to an error of omission, but only possibly of co-mission, 
which reads partially as follows: 
**Trustees shall divide the balance of the trust 
estate into equal shares, one for each of Grantor's 
children then living, and one for each of Grantor's 
children then deceased leaving living descendants 
*** 
. 
This provision is of such clarity as cannot have been 
read without its clear and unequivocal meaning being understood 
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even by a layman. (R-50) 
In spite of the clear-cut language of this dispositive 
provision above, the testimony of the scrivener stated as follows: 
I apparently left out an exclusion for the deceased 
children, the son of Mrs* Rentmeister; either 
I dictated it and my secretary left it out in 
the transcription, or I failed to dictate it. 
(R-88) 
Counsel for Settlor, who was the scrivener, further 
testified that while the paragraph was clear, that it talks 
about a deceased child, and "that it could mean a deceased child 
subsequent to the execution of this document11. (R-97) 
The attention of the Court is then called to paragraph 
4a of the original Trust Agreement, wherein it provides as follows: 
DISTRIBUTION TO DESCENDANTS. On the death of 
a child of Grantor or lawful descendant of the 
deceased child of Grantor for whom a trust is 
then held, such trust, to the extent not appointed 
as hereinabove provided, shall be apportioned 
in partial shares among his or her living lawful 
descendants upon the principle of representation, 
***. (R-51) 
If it was the belief and intent, that paragraph F applied 
only to the deceased children of living beneficiaries, then 
it would appear that paragraph 4a, which provided for distribution 
to the descendants, is purely redundant. 
The Appellant has cited Paulson v. Kunz, 253 P.2d 621, 
as authority for the reformation of the Trust Agreement before 
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this Court, which Respondent submits to the Court, this case 
is substantially less than on all fours with the instant matter 
before the Court, in that the Paulson case was the reformation 
of a contract with all of the parties living and able to present 
their own testimony and not as in the instant matter, wherein 
the Settlor is demised and the scrivener is attempting to change 
the entire dispositive provisions of a Trust Agreement by what 
he orally states is the intent of the Settlor. 
Even in the Paulson case, this Court stated: 
Without discussing the propriety of or authority 
for such procedure, it is difficult to perceive 
.how one can arrive at the conclusion, that three 
is clear and convincing evidence for the extra 
ordinary relief by way of reformation, considering 
the law's policy to lend dignity to written instru-
ments and sanctity to the Parol Evidence Rule. 
The fact that one is ignorant of the contents 
of the paper he signs necessarily does not relieve 
him from contractual liability and should not 
do so here. 
The Court in the Paulson case did not allow the reforma-
tion of the contract and the similarity between the Paulson 
case and the instant matter is that the scrivener alleged, 
that after dictating the trust, that he did not bother to read 
it (R-96). A more unexplainable part of the contention of 
the Appellants is the fact, that upon the amendment of the 
original Trust Agreementf which occurred more than three years 
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subsequent to the making of the first Trust Agreement, that 
the scrivener did not again read the instrument prior to making 
an amendment and revision of the original Trust Agreement/ 
when the specific bequest to the Respondent was changed from 
$5/000.00 in the first Trust Agreement to $7/000.00 in the 
Amended Trust Agreement. (R-55) It is testified to that as 
a matter of fact/ the scrivener did not know of the error allegedly 
made in the two instruments of trust until Counsel for Respondent 
made demand for distribution in accordance with the terms of 
the Trust of one-fourth of the estate, which demand occurred 
in 1974. (R-89) 
The Appellants cite the case of Webb v. Webb/ 209 P.2d 
201/ on page 5 of Appellants1 Brief, in support of the right 
of revision of an inter vivos trust following the demise of 
the Settlor, when as a matter of fact the question decided 
by the Court was whether or not a deed in form absolute was 
intended as a mortgage to secure advancements or as an outright 
transfer of title for a consideration of $500.00. 
This was not an action to change the terms of an inter 
vivos trust agreement or of a Will, but simply pertained as 
to the upholding or disclaimer of the absolute form of a written 
deed for which consideration has been paid. 
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This Honorable Court held In Re Beal's Estate, 214 P.2d 
525: 
The rule of construction, that the intent of the 
Testator must be carried out, does not authorize 
Courts to make a new Will to conform to what 
they think the Testator intended, but the intent 
of the Testator must be ascertained from the 
Will as it stands. 
Appellants cite Sine v. Harper, 222 P.2d 571, which 
was heard by this Honorable Court as to the reformation of 
a deed, and seeks to use the langauge of this Court as authority 
for the testimony of the Attorney for the Settlor, who was 
also the scrivener, changing the intent and purpose of the 
plain words of the inter vivos trust to what the scrivener 
alleges to be the intent of the Settlor. 
The action in the Sine case was for the reformation 
of a deed on the grounds of mutual mistake and the statements 
made by purchasers through their agent was held to be admissible 
for purposes of showing beliefs of the purchasers or to establish 
the extent of the agent's authority. 
It is pointed out to this Court, that the Court restated 
its position as held in George v. Fritsch Loan & Trust Company, 
69 Ut. 460, 256 P. 400, 403, wherein the Court stated: 
The law is well settled in this and in other jurisdic-
tions, that a written contract will be reformed 
to express the agreement of the parties when the 
proof of the mistake is clear, definite, and convincing, 
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and where the party seeking the reformation is 
not guilty of negligence in the execution of the 
contract nor laches in making timely application 
for its reformation.** 
It is suggested to this Court that in the instant matter 
before it, there is no clear and convincing evidence as to 
the intent of the Settlor, other than the clear language of 
the Trust Agreement itself, and that the scrivener, as well 
as the Co-Trustees, beneficiaries and Appellants, are free 
from negligence in the final wording of the inter vivos trust, 
in that the testimony of the Settlorfs Counsel, who is also 
the scrivener, was to the effect that the Settlor's Counsel 
testified he personally dictated the original Trust Agreement 
and the Amendment to the Trust Agreement (R-88); that Counsel 
for the Settlor did not read the Trust Agreement prior to the 
subscription thereto (R-96); and the testimony f^urther that 
the Settlor's Counsel believed that the three Co-Trustees, 
beneficiaries and Appellants, also read the Trust Agreement 
prior to the subscription thereto by the Settlor. 
The laches would be evidenced by the fact, that the 
original Trust Agreement was subscribed to on October 3, 1968, 
by the Settlor and the three Co-Trustees, and that an Amendment 
was made to the Trust Agreement on November 8, 1971, (R-51,R-
551, and that no action was taken by the Co-Trustees or the 
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Settlor's Counsel for a revision of the Trust Agreement until 
an Answer and Counterclaim was filed by the Co-Trustees on v i*** 
April 10, 1974. (R-4) 
In the Estate of John W. Baum, 4 Ut.2d 375, 294 P.2d 
711, this Court held: 
Elementary in the law of Wills, is that the intention 
of the Testator must govern. To arrive at that 
intention, the Courts must consider the Will in 
its entirety and not merely the particular clauses 
which are in dispute. This Court has recognized 
that a Testator has a right to dispose of his 
property as he sees fit, and he may disinherit 
close relatives if he desires, no particular form 
of disinheritance being necessary to accomplish 
that objective. All that need appear is that 
Testator intentionally excluded the particular 
heir. 
This Court further held in the cited case, that extrinsic 
evidence cannot be resorted to to dispute the Testator's recitals 
where the intention of the Testator is manifested. 
If this Court deems that it is proper and possible to 
reconstruct the intent of a Settlor, where there is a variation 
of such intention as alleged by the Settlor's Counsel in testi-
mony more then seven years following the drafting of the original 
Trust Agreement, and where the language of the dispositive 
terms of the trust are clear and unequivocal, then it is submitted 
to the Court, that there are some interesting aspects of the •-«*— 
intent of the Settlor as were recited by the scrivener justifying 
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the special bequest to the Respondent, as well as allowing 
Respondent equal participation in the residuary estate. 
The scrivener testified that at the time of the making 
of the original Trust Agreement of October 3, 1968, (R-53), 
that the Settlor stated to the scrivener, that her son, Ned, 
had been killed somewhere in 1944 or thereabouts, and that 
as a result of the demise of her son, Ned, that the Settlor 
received $10,000.00 in insurance as the G.I. beneficiary of 
the son (R-92). The Respondent, Larry R. Rentmeister, is the 
only child and heir of the Settlor's son, Ned, and, of course, 
was living at the time that the Settlor received her. son's 
$10,000.00 G.I. insurance. 
It was further testified to by the Settlor's Counsel, 
that at the time of the drafting of the 1968 inter vivos trust, 
the Settlor did not advise the scrivener of the amount that 
she wanted to leave to her grandson, the Respondent herein 
(R-83), and that the scrivener further testified: 
My notes reflect a dollar sign and blank. Later 
she called me and through her own son sent a 
note to me telling the total amount to be left 
to the grandson (R-83) . 
The scrivener further testified that on the telephone, 
the Settlor stated that she wanted the blank amount of the 
specific bequest to be in the sum of $5,000.00. 
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The scrivener further testified that about 1971, the 
Settlor telephoned and stated that she wanted to increase the 
specific bequest for her grandson and have it changed from 
$5,000.00 to $7,000.00. (R-88) 
The lack of decisiveness of the Settlor at the time 
of the drafting of the inter vivos trust, as has been hereinabove 
set forth, together with the setting first of an amount of 
$5,000.00 and then an amount of $7,000.00 as a specific bequest 
for the Respondent, coupled with the admitted fact that the 
Settlor received G.I. insurance in the amount of $10,000.00 
or more from her son, Ned, who is the father of the Respondent 
herein, all is indicative of an intent, if inferences are to 
be made, of what the intent of the Settlor was at the time 
of the drafting of the inter vivos trust, and can just as readily 
be seen as the desire of a 78-year old mother and grandmother 
(R-33), to do justice to her deceased son's only child by returning 
to him the monies received as a result of the death of her 
son and the G.I. insurance in the amount of $10,000.00, or 
more, having declared the Settlor as a beneficiary, instead 
of the grandson, who was the only living child of her son, 
Ned. 
It is submitted to the Court, that if there was any ~~~ 
indecisiveness on the part of the Settlor as to what to leave 
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to her grandson, it was only how much of the insurance proceeds 
received by Settlor from her son should be returned to Respondent 
and not as to whether or not her deceased son's only living 
son, the Respondent, should share equally in the residuary 
estate with her other three children. 
The Appellants have cited Hurst v. Kravis, 333 P.2d 
314, as authority that a trust may be reformed because of a 
mistake and clerical error, but it is submitted to the Court, 
that this citation is not in point in the instant matter before 
the Court, in that reformation was being sought on behalf of 
all of the direct beneficiaries of the trust in accordance 
with the Statute of the State of Oklahoma, wherein contingent 
beneficiaries were also a party brought in as a class, also 
in accordance with Oklahoma Statutes for the purpose of clarifying 
the investment terms of the trust which in its existing form 
did not make possible the carrying out of the intent of the 
Settlor. i 
Appellants cite the case of Ford v. Ford, 492 S.W.2d 
376, as a citation in support of the position of the Appellants, 
that an irrevocable trust may be modified where the Attorney 
for the Settlor made a mistake in drafting of the trust. It 
was clearly shown in this case, that the intent was to make 
the trust irrevocable for a period of ten years in order that 
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special tax benefits would benefit the Settlors, and in constructing 
., it, the Attorney set forth that the property was conveyed "absolutely 
and irrevocably for a term in excess of ten years, as hereinafter 
designated". 
The error made was that Section 2 of the trust instrument 
provided that the trust would become effective from the 1st 
day of Januaryf 1967, and continuing until January 4, 1976, 
on which date the beneficiary would be 21 years of age, but 
the fact was that the beneficiary became 21 years of age nine 
years and four days after the date of the creation of the trust 
and was, therefore, in conflict with not only the intent and 
the purpose of obtaining tax benefits by establishing the proper 
time period in the trust, and the Court allowed a change of 
trust based upon error in order that the intent of the Settlor 
and the purpose of the trust would be carried out and the conflict 
of the period of the trust removed. 
The Appellants cite the case of Leitner v. Goldwater, 
48 N.Y.2d 614, (App.Br.p.9). In some manner, this is supposed 
to be affirmative of the position of the Appellants and the 
attention of the Court is called to the cited part therein 
where it states in the case and has been recited by Appellants, 
that: 
The Court further observed that the failure of 
the Settlors to read the modification which they 
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signed, because they were busy men who imposed 
great confidence in their lawyer, would not of 
itself vitiate the right to reformation. 
It should be noted by the Court, that the Counsel for 
the Settlor has testified that the Settlor did read the Trust 
Agreement, as well as the three co-beneficiaries and trustees, 
but it was the Attorney who did not read the Trust Agreement 
after having dictated it personally, (R-54,-95,-96), and it 
is, therefore, submitted that this citation is somewhat the 
opposite as to the present factual situation before the Court, 
Appellants cite the case of Vogel v. City Bank Fireman's 
Trust Company, 272 N.Y.2d 643, as authority by the Supreme 
Court of New York County, that a trust deed can be reformed 
based upon an error and mistake of the attorney who prepared 
the document in failing to include a revocation clause. 
Respondent has no argument with the finding of the Court, 
but cites glaring distinction in the instant matter before 
the Court and in the Vogel facts. 
In the Vogel case, supra, the Settlor was the father 
of a daughter and created a trust intended to provide for the 
daughter and her issue for only so long as such financial protection 
was necessary, and asked his attorney to so draft a trust instrument. 
The attorney drafted the trust agreement as an irrevocable 
trust and subsequently it became unnecessary for the financial 
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protection of the daughter and her issue to have the trust 
i* inasmuch as from another source, a large trust was created -oe 
for the daughter and her children. 
An action was brought for modification of the Trust 
Agreement and was brought by the still living Settlor, together 
with his wife, and the adult and minor beneficiaries of the 
trust, all stating to the Court the purpose of the trust and 
testifying as to what the intent was for the drafting of same, 
and that it should have been drawn as a revocable trust. The 
Court with all parties interested in the Trust Agreement being 
in agreement, other than the Bank Trustee, the Court held: 
If it appears that the power to revoke should 
have been expressed in the instrument, a Court 
of equity will now regard as done whatever the 
parties really intended, and which in good conscience 
should have been done, and thus, the relief will 
be adapted to the exigencies of the case. 
It is further submitted to the Court, that the additional 
case citations by the Appellants, all of which involve the 
modification of a deed, which are set forth as citations by 
Appellants on pages 9, 10, and 11 of Plaintiff's Brief, (Sheedy 
v. Stine, 101 N.Y.2d 773; Delap v. Leonard, 178 N.Y.2d 102; 
Mills v. Shulba, 213 P.2d 408; and Sunnybrook Children's Home, 
Inc. v. Dahlem, 265 So.2d 921;) are totally distinguishable 
from the attempted modification of an inter vivos trust seven 
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years following the creation of the trust and following the 
demise of the Settlor, by evidence that is not clear and convincing.uu-u ^ 
Appellants cite the case of First National Bank & Trust 
Company of Oklahoma City of Oklahoma v. Foster, 346 F.2d 49, 
U.S.C.A. 10th Circ. (1965), on page 8 of Appellants1 Brief, 
upholding that the intention of the Settlor should control 
if not in conflict with established principles of law and an 
action requiring the Co-Trustees to accept an amendment or 
supplement to the Trust Agreement they were administering. 
It should be noted that in this cited case, the Settlor, 
who was the Plaintiff in the cited case, reserved the right 
to provide by a supplemental writing the manner of distribution 
of the corpus of the irrevocable trust upon the demise of the 
Settlor and the challenge made by the trustees and beneficiaries 
of the trust was to the right of the Settlor to make more than 
one change in the beneficiaries and in the manner of distribution 
of the corpus of the trust. The right of the Settlor was upheld 
by the decision in this case and has no relevancy to the instant 
matter before the Court. 
The Appellants cite Artmar, Inc. v. United States Fire 
and Casualty Company, 148 N.W.2d 641, Sup.Ct. of Wise, as 
authority in the instant matter before the Court, even though 
the case deals with the negligence of an insurance agent, the 
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Court allowed a modification of the insurance contract and 
alleged that in insurance cases, that less is required to make 
out a cause of action for reformation than ordinary contract 
disputes. 
In The Matter of the Estate of Eben E. Robinson, Deceased, 
280 P.2d 676, Sup.Ct. of Wash., (Mar., 1955), an attempt by 
the Executor of the estate to establish by extrinsic evidence 
the Testator's intent, and particularly permitting the Attorney 
who drew the Will to testify over legatee's objection on the 
matter of the Testator's intent. 
The Court held that such testimony was in error, the 
Court stating: 
Appellant contends that the Court erred in per-
mitting the Attorney who drew the Will and a bank 
representative, to testify, over Appellant's objection, 
concerning the intent of the Testator with reference 
to the bequest in question. With this contention, 
we agree for the reason that the intent of the 
Testator in this respect was ascertainable from 
the document itself, without the necessity of 
extrinsic evidence. 
The Court further stated as the law of the State of 
Washington, that the intent of the Testator must be determined 
without going outside the four corners of the Will if it is 
possible. 
In the case of In Re Poppleton's Estate, 34 Ut. 285, 
97 P. 138, this Court held that the intention of the Testator 
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is to be ascertained from the language used by the Testator 
in the Will,, and if the meaning is clear from the words that 
are used, that no resort to any construction is necessary nor 
permissible, but: 
Where, however, meaning of a word or phrase employed 
by the Testator is not clear, and may be given 
either one of two or more meanings when read in 
the light of the whole instrument, the Courts 
may not only, but are required to look to the 
conditions and circumstances surrounding the Testator 
at the time the Will was made and in the light 
of these determine his true intention. 
This Court set the basic standard of determination of 
the intent of a testamentary instrument in the case of In Re 
Bealf s Estate, 214 P.2d 525, when it held that the rule of 
construction that the intent of the Testator must be carried 
out does not authorize the Courts to make a new Will to conform 
to what they think the Testator intended, but the intent of 
the Testator must be ascertained from the Will as it stands• 
This Court's opinion in the Beal case, supra, is similar 
to the holding of the District Court of Appeal for California 
in the case of In Re Avila's Estate, 192 P.2d 64, wherein the 
Court held that the testimony of an attorney who drew the Will 
as to what the Testatrix had said to him before the Will was 
drafted was inadmissible where the language in the Will presented 
no ambiguity calling for any judicial interpretation. The 
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Court further stated: 
The purpose of construction as applied to Wills 
is unquestionably to arrive, if possible, at 
the intention of the Testator; but the intention 
to be sought for is not that which existed in 
the mind of the Testator, but that which is expressed 
in the language of the Will. It is not the business 
of the Court to say, in examining the terms of 
the Will, what the Testator intended, but what 
is the meaning to be given to the language which 
he used. Where the terms of the Will are free 
from ambiguity, the language used must be interpreted 
according to its ordinary meaning and legal import, 
and the intention of the Testator ascertained 
thereby. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that the inter 
vivos trust before this Court is clear and unequivocal as to 
its meaning and import and that there is no latent or patent 
ambiguity in the instrument before the Court, and that the 
scrivener having drafted a trust instrument, which he dictated 
himself, and which was read by the Settlor and by the three 
Trustees and beneficiaries, without dissent or complaint during 
the lifetime of the Settlor, should not now be allowed to testify 
in a manner contrary to the terms of the trust as to the disposition 
of the trust estate, and that if in fact there was negligence 
in the drafting of the inter vivos trust agreement on the part 
of Counsel for the Settlor, that the remedy for the Co-Trustees 
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and beneficiaries lies with the negligent party and not in 
a modification of the inter vivos trust agreement. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETE NT VLAHOSV "^-^ 
Attorney for Respondent 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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